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GOT WATER? LIMITING WASHINGTON’S 
STOCKWATERING EXEMPTION TO FIVE THOUSAND 
GALLONS PER DAY 
Kara Dunn 
Abstract: In Washington, a comprehensive groundwater code governs groundwater 
withdrawals and use. This regulatory scheme protects water users, minimizes disputes over 
water rights, and maximizes the beneficial use of public water resources. Despite these 
protections, groundwater resources are declining in many parts of the state. Washington 
exempts certain types of small withdrawals from the groundwater code’s regulations, 
including water for livestock. Conflicting interpretations of this stock-watering exemption 
have created uncertainty over whether exempt stock-watering withdrawals are unlimited, or 
are limited to 5000 gallons per day. This Comment analyzes the conflicting interpretations of 
the groundwater exemption statute under Washington’s rules of statutory interpretation and 
argues that the stock-watering exemption is limited to 5000 gallons per day. This conclusion 
is based on the context of the statute, the historical circumstances surrounding its enactment, 
and important policy considerations,.  
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a dairy farm in the arid eastern region of Washington State.1 
The dairy’s herd of 2500 cows consumes approximately 45,000 gallons 
of water per day (gpd). Water is a public resource in Washington,2 so 
prospective water users must apply for a permit from the State before 
withdrawing water from streams or aquifers.3 The permitting statute 
exempts specific types of small withdrawals from these permitting 
requirements, however, including “any withdrawal of public ground 
waters for stock-watering purposes . . . .”4 Although other exempt uses 
are limited to 5000 gpd,5 the dairy farm believes that this limitation does 
                                                     
1. Fictional scenario based on the facts in DeVries v. Dep’t of Ecology, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA 
ENV LEXIS 46 (Sept. 27, 2001). 
2. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.020 (2006).  
3. See id. § 90.44.050. 
4. Id. § 90.44.050. “[S]tockwatering purposes covers all reasonable uses of water normally 
associated with the sound husbandry of livestock. This includes, but is not limited to, drinking, 
feeding, cleaning their stalls, washing them, washing the equipment used to feed or milk them, 
controlling dust around them and cooling them.” DeVries, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS at 
*23−24. 
5. Id. (except irrigation of a noncommercial garden, which is limited to one-half acre). 
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not apply to its withdrawal of 45,000 gpd because the statute exempts 
“any withdrawal” for stock-watering purposes.6 
The Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology), the 
Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB), and the Washington State 
Attorney General (Attorney General) recently examined this issue and 
arrived at conflicting conclusions. Ecology initially concluded that 
stock-watering withdrawals are limited to 5000 gpd by relying on the 
statutory and historical context of the exemption.7 In 2001 the PCHB 
agreed with this interpretation in DeVries v. Department of Ecology.8 A 
2005 Attorney General opinion concluded that the plain meaning of the 
statute allows unlimited stock-watering withdrawals, however, and 
Ecology has subsequently changed its practices to accord with this 
opinion.9  
The distinction between a limited and unlimited exemption is 
significant because declining groundwater levels and a proliferation of 
exempt groundwater withdrawals currently impede sustainable 
management of Washington’s groundwater resources. Increasing 
reliance on groundwater has overstressed aquifers across the nation.10 In 
Washington, rapid population growth has placed significant pressure on 
groundwater resources.11 These demands have caused declining 
groundwater levels across the state, especially in the eastern and 
southeastern regions,12 where the majority of the state’s livestock farms 
                                                     
6. Id. 
7. See DeVries, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS at *15−21 (granting summary judgment to 
Ecology on issue of whether WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 limits stock-watering to 5000 gallons 
per day). 
8. Id. 
9. 2005 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 17, 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/page.aspx?id=1738; Press Release, Dep’t of Ecology, New Att’y General 
Opinion Addresses Livestock Watering Issue (Nov. 30, 2005), 
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2005news/2005-289.html [hereinafter Ecology Press Release]. 
10. See J. R. BARTOLINO & W. L. CUNNINGHAM, U.S. GEOLOGICAL STUDY, GROUNDWATER 
DEPLETION ACROSS THE NATION 2 (2003), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-103-
03/JBartolinoFS(2.13.04).pdf; JEFFREY S. ASHLEY & ZACHARY A. SMITH, GROUNDWATER 
MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST 1 (1999). 
11. See ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 10, at 75, 77; see also Robert N. Caldwell, Six-Packs for 
Subdivisions: The Cumulative Effects of Washington’s Domestic Well Exemption, 28 ENVTL. L. 
1099, 1107−08 (1998) (estimating new wells for withdrawing exempt groundwater were being 
constructed at a rate of 8500 per year in the 1990s). 
12. See ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 10, at 79; Elliot Bruhl & Dale R. Ralston, Ground Water 
Management under the Appropriation Doctrine, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NWWA FOCUS 
CONFERENCE ON NORTHWESTERN GROUND WATER ISSUES 11, 13 (1987). 
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are located.13 As water availability declines, Ecology is forced to deny 
an increasing number of water use applications to protect senior water 
rights.14 Consequently, new water users are turning to the statutory 
exemptions from the groundwater permitting requirements.15 Although 
the exact quantity of exempt withdrawals is unknown, because such 
withdrawals are unregulated, it is clear that the total amount of 
groundwater withdrawn under the exemption is significant.16 An 
unlimited exemption for stock-watering could exacerbate current 
groundwater management issues, because such exempt withdrawals 
occur outside Ecology’s permitting authority.17 
This Comment analyzes the conflicting interpretations of 
Washington’s stock-watering exemption and argues that the exemption 
is limited to 5000 gpd. This conclusion is based on Washington’s 
principles of statutory interpretation, the statute’s historical background, 
and public policy considerations.18 Part I discusses Washington’s surface 
and groundwater codes and examines the structure of the groundwater 
exemption statute. Part II examines the historical context surrounding 
the exemption statute’s enactment and the subsequent rise of 
industrialized livestock farms. Part III describes the conflicting 
interpretations of the stock-watering exemption, and Part IV discusses 
                                                     
13. See, e.g., Tristan D. Skoldrud, Erik O’Donoghue, C. Richard Shumway, & Almuhanad 
Melhim, Farm Growth, Consolidation, and Diversification: Washington Dairy Industry, CHOICES: 
THE MAGAZINE OF FOOD, FARM, AND RESOURCE ISSUES, 2nd Quarter 2007, at 125, available at 
http://www.choicesmagazine.org/2007-2/grabbag/2007-2-07.pdf. (observing that Washington’s 
dairy industry is becoming highly concentrated on the eastern side of the state). 
14. See ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 10, at 83. Under the prior appropriation doctrine, water 
rights are based on a hierarchy of priority. In times of drought or shortage, water users with “junior” 
water rights must defer to “senior” or older water rights. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2006). 
The prior appropriation doctrine is discussed in greater detail infra at Part I.A 
15. See Bill Clarke, Exempt Wells: The End of the Controversy or Just the Beginning?, 
AMERICAN WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION WASH. SECTION NEWSLETTER, Jan.–Feb. 2002, at 2, 
available at http://earth.golder.com/waawra/PDF/2002-01-waarwranews.pdf. 
16. See Caldwell, supra note 11, at 1105. 
17. See DeVries v. Dep’t of Ecology, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46, at *17 (Sept. 27, 
2001) (“[A]n unlimited, and uncontrollable, potential for withdrawal of groundwater . . . could have 
a potentially devastating effect on the ability of the state to protect the senior water right holders or 
to grant future water rights.”). 
18. This Comment addresses the quantity of water that may be withdrawn under the stock-
watering exemption, and not the type of activity that is properly classified as “stock-watering” (e.g. 
whether withdrawals for concentrated animal feeding operations should be considered “stock-
watering” as opposed to a “commercial” use of water and therefore limited by the “industrial 
purpose” exemption in WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006)). 
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Washington’s principles of statutory interpretation. Finally, Part V 
argues that the stock-watering exemption is limited to 5000 gpd. 
I. WASHINGTON WATER LAW COMPREHENSIVELY 
REGULATES GROUNDWATER AND EXEMPTS SMALL 
WITHDRAWALS FROM ITS PERMITTING SYSTEM 
Washington groundwater is comprehensively regulated by a 
groundwater code that exempts small withdrawals from its permitting 
system.19 The Legislature enacted the groundwater code to prevent 
destructive competition for groundwater by providing uniform 
regulations and a centralized administration for governing water rights.20 
Although specific types of withdrawals are exempt from the 
groundwater code’s permitting requirements, they remain subject to 
other regulations within the groundwater code.21 
A. The Surface and Groundwater Codes Were Enacted to Protect 
Senior Water Users, Minimize Disputes Over Water Rights, and 
Protect Public Water Resources 
The prior appropriation doctrine governs water use in Washington, as 
it does in most western states.22 Under the riparian doctrine, which 
traditionally governed water use in the eastern states, only lands adjacent 
to water are entitled to a water right.23 In contrast, the prior appropriation 
doctrine allows water users to acquire water rights by appropriating 
water and putting it to a beneficial use.24 Prior appropriation also 
protects senior water users by providing that between appropriators from 
the same water source, the first in time has a higher priority water 
                                                     
19. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006). 
20. See WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THIRTEENTH 
BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 44 (1946) 
[hereinafter WDCD]; 1945 Wash. Sess. Laws 826 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 
90.44 (2006)); infra Part I.A. 
21. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.44.050 (2006) (exempting certain types of withdrawals from 
permitting requirements), 90.44.030 (stating existing rights shall not be affected), 90.44.110 
(prohibiting waste of water); infra Part I.B. 
22. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2006); DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND 
RESOURCES § 5.01 (1989). 
23. See TARLOCK, supra note 22, at §§ 3.02, 3.09(1); Christopher L. Len, Synthesis: A Brand 
New Water Law, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 55, 59−61 (2004). 
24. See TARLOCK, supra note 22, at § 5.08(1); see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2006) 
(adopting prior appropriation doctrine). 
DUNN_FINAL.DOC  6/10/2008 5:49:37 PM 
Desktop Publishing Example 
253 
right.25 The gold miners and farmers who first settled the western 
territories developed this system because land that was not adjacent to 
water in the arid regions of the west was practically worthless under the 
riparian doctrine.26 Appropriation based on need, rather than on riparian 
property rights, facilitated successful settlement.27 
Between 1889 and 1917, Washington recognized water rights under 
both the riparian and prior appropriation doctrines. Beginning with 
Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co.28 in 1889, the Washington State Supreme 
Court considered the question of water rights in several cases and 
protected both rights by appropriation and rights by riparian 
ownership.29 In addition to the case law, Washington had many 
conflicting statutes regarding the right to use water.30 This resulted in a 
chaotic and confused state of the law, which, in turn, led to continuous 
disputes among water users throughout the state.31 To create clarity and 
security for water users,32 the Washington State Legislature enacted a 
comprehensive surface water code in 1917.33 This code adopted the prior 
appropriation doctrine34 and created a centralized administration for 
determining the existence of water rights35 and establishing new rights,36 
thereby ensuring the most efficient use of water resources.  
Several decades later, the 1945 Legislature passed the groundwater 
code as a supplement to the surface water code, extending the 
protections and regulations of the surface water code to groundwater.37 
Although the Legislature did not explicitly state its purpose for enacting 
the groundwater code, the Washington Department of Conservation and 
                                                     
25. See TARLOCK, supra note 22, at § 5.08(1); see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2006) 
(adopting prior appropriation doctrine). 
26. See TARLOCK, supra note 22, at § 5.02; Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in 
Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 318−20 (1985). 
27. See Charles Horowitz, Riparian and Appropriation Rights to the Use of Water in Washington, 
7 WASH. L. REV. 197, 200 (1932). 
28. 1 Wash. 566, 20 P. 588 (1889). 
29. See id. at 569, 20 P. at 589; Horowitz, supra note 27, at 203−04. 
30. WDCD, supra note 20, at 24. 
31. WDCD, supra note 20, at 24. 
32. See WDCD, supra note 20, at 24; Horowitz, supra note 27, at 208. 
33. 1917 Wash. Sess. Laws 447 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03 (2006)) 
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2006). 
35. Id.§ 90.03.245.  
36. Id. §§ 90.03.250−340. 
37. 1945 Wash. Sess. Laws 826 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44 (2006)) 
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Development (Department of Conservation),38 which was the agency 
responsible for water resources in 1945, described the reasons for its 
enactment in a 1946 report. In the report, the Department of 
Conservation stated that the groundwater bill was prepared and 
sponsored at the request of an association of Washington cities to protect 
the 126 cities that depended on groundwater for domestic uses, 
irrigation, and industrial purposes.39 The Department of Conservation 
also noted that “destructive competition has been the experience of 
certain other states,” and “[i]n some sections of this State, uncontrolled 
withdrawal of [ground]water has already caused damage to existing 
rights and investments.”40 This report indicates that the Legislature 
enacted the groundwater code to protect existing rights, avoid damaging 
competition, and provide security for future development.41 
B. The Groundwater Code Provides Comprehensive Regulations for 
Obtaining a Water Right Permit, with an Exemption for Small 
Withdrawals of Water 
The groundwater code is supplementary to the surface water code.42 
Because the groundwater code extended the provisions of the surface 
water code to govern groundwater appropriations,43 it is important to 
first understand the relevant provisions of the surface water code. The 
surface water code adopted the prior appropriation doctrine44 and created 
a permitting system that allows the state to control the distribution and 
utilization of surface water resources.45 Under this permitting system, a 
prospective water user must obtain a permit from Ecology before 
appropriating water.46 Before issuing a permit, Ecology must find “(1) 
that water is available, (2) for a beneficial use, and that (3) an 
appropriation will not impair existing rights or (4) be detrimental to the 
                                                     
38. The Department of Conservation was responsible for many of the state’s natural resources, 
including water. See OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, HISTORIES OF WASHINGTON STATE 
AGENCIES 45 (1996). In the 1960s the department was abolished and replaced with the Department 
of Natural Resources and the Department of Ecology. See id. 
39. WDCD, supra note 20, at 44. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.020 (2006). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. § 90.03.010.  
45. Id. § 90.03.250.  
46. Id. § 90.44.050.  
DUNN_FINAL.DOC  6/10/2008 5:49:37 PM 
Desktop Publishing Example 
255 
public welfare.”47 The surface water code also mandates that none of its 
provisions “shall be construed to lessen, enlarge, or modify . . . any 
existing right acquired by appropriation, or otherwise.”48 
The groundwater code adopted most of these surface water code 
provisions. The groundwater code’s purpose is “regulating and 
controlling the ground waters of the state.”49 Because groundwater 
withdrawals can impact surface water resources in areas where surface 
water and groundwater are connected, the groundwater code protects 
existing surface water rights by mandating that surface water rights 
existing when the code was enacted “shall not be affected or impaired by 
any of the provisions of this supplementary chapter.”50 The groundwater 
code also adopts the prior appropriation rules and permitting system 
established in the surface water code.51 Unlike the surface water code, 
however, the groundwater code provides an exception to the permitting 
system.52 
The groundwater code’s general permitting requirement provides: 
After June 6, 1945, no withdrawal of public ground waters of 
the state shall be begun, nor shall any well or other works for 
such withdrawal be constructed, unless an application to 
appropriate such waters has been made to the department [of 
Ecology] and a permit has been granted by it as herein 
provided . . . .53 
This general rule requires prospective groundwater users to apply to 
Ecology for a permit before withdrawing public groundwater, and 
Ecology must make the same findings required in the surface water code 
before granting the permit application.54 This general rule is followed by 
                                                     
47. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 43 P.3d 4, 8 (2002) (citing 
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.290(3)). 
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (2006). 
49. Id. § 90.44.020. 
50. Id. § 90.44.030; see also Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 227 n.1, 858 
P.2d 232, 236 n.1 (1993) (“[WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.030] emphasizes the potential connections 
between groundwater and surface water and makes evident the Legislature’s intent that groundwater 
rights be considered in part of the overall water appropriation scheme, subject to the paramount rule 
of ‘first in time, first in right.’”). 
51. Id. §§ 90.44.040 (groundwater subject to appropriation); 90.44.060 (“Applications for permits 
for appropriation of underground water shall be made in the same form and manner provided in 
RCW 90.03.250 through 90.03.340 [surface water code] . . . .”). 
52. Id. § 90.44.050. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. § 90.44.060. 
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an exception, in the form of an exemption provision, and two modifying 
provisions. The exemption provision states: 
EXCEPT, HOWEVER, That any withdrawal of public ground 
waters for stock-watering purposes, or for the watering of a 
lawn or of a noncommercial garden not exceeding one-half acre 
in area, or for single or group domestic uses in an amount not 
exceeding five thousand gallons a day, or as provided in RCW 
90.44.052 [applicable only in Whitman County], or for an 
industrial purpose in an amount not exceeding five thousand 
gallons a day, is and shall be exempt from the provisions of this 
section, but, to the extent that it is regularly used beneficially, 
shall be entitled to a right equal to that established by a permit 
issued under the provisions of this chapter . . . .55 
This provision exempts four categories of water use from the general 
permitting rule: stock-watering, irrigation, domestic uses, and industrial 
uses.56 Three of these categories are specifically limited—irrigation of a 
lawn or garden is restricted to a half acre, and domestic and industrial 
uses are limited to 5000 gpd—while the stock-watering provision does 
not contain a specific limitation.57 Although these categories of 
withdrawals are exempt from the permitting requirement, all 
groundwater withdrawals are subject to the mandate that existing surface 
water appropriations “shall not be affected or impaired by any provisions 
of [the groundwater code],”58 and the mandate that senior appropriators 
are entitled to a “safe sustaining yield” of groundwater.59 
Two modifying provisions follow the exemption provision: 
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the department from time to 
time may require the person or agency making any such small 
withdrawal to furnish information as to the means for and the 
quantity of that withdrawal: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That at 
the option of the party making withdrawals of ground waters of 
the state not exceeding five thousand gallons per day, 
applications under this section or declarations under RCW 
90.44.090 may be filed and permits and certificates obtained in 
the same manner and under the same requirements as is in this 
                                                     
55. Id. § 90.44.050 (emphasis added). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. § 90.44.030.  
59. Id. § 90.44.130; see also Caldwell, supra note 11, at 1103−04.  
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chapter provided in the case of withdrawals in excess of five 
thousand gallons a day.60 
The first proviso authorizes Ecology to require exempt users to report 
the purpose and quantity of their withdrawals, and describes all exempt 
uses as “small withdrawal[s].”61 The second proviso, added in 1947,62 
provides that users may voluntarily obtain a permit for their exempt 
withdrawals, and it describes the exempt withdrawals as “not exceeding 
five thousand gallons per day.”63 When reviewing the statute as a whole, 
it is unclear whether the statute allows unlimited use because it lacks a 
specific limitation for the stock-watering exemption, or whether the 
statute limits stock-watering to “small withdrawals” not exceeding 5000 
gpd through the modifying provisos. 
While the groundwater code’s stock-watering exemption lacks clarity, 
what is clear is that the circumstances surrounding the surface water and 
groundwater codes’ enactment strongly indicate that the Legislature 
created these codes to minimize water disputes and protect the public’s 
water resources from destructive competition.64 The groundwater code 
adopted the surface water code’s protections and regulations for 
groundwater.65 Unlike the surface water code, however, the groundwater 
code contains an exception to the general permitting requirements for 
specific categories of water use, including withdrawals for stock-
watering.66  This exemption statute fails to clearly convey the limitations 
that govern the stock-watering exemption. 
II. ALTHOUGH STOCK-WATERING WAS MINIMAL WHEN 
THE LEGISLATURE ENACTED THE EXEMPTION IN 1945, 
IT HAS SINCE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED 
Although the exemption statute does not specifically limit stock-
watering, historical context shows that stock-watering did not exceed 
1500 gpd on an average farm in Washington when the Legislature 
                                                     
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006) (emphasis added). 
61. Id. 
62. See 1947 Wash. Sess. Laws 655 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 
(2006)). 
63. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006). 
64. See supra Part I.A. 
65. See supra Part I.B. 
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006). 
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enacted the statute in 1945.67 Since 1945, however, the industrialization 
of the livestock industry has substantially increased the size of livestock 
farms and the amount of water a single farm is capable of using.68 The 
historical background and subsequent development of stock-watering 
provides a historical context for understanding the Legislature’s intent 
when it enacted the stock-watering exemption.69  
A. Stock-watering Requirements For a Fully Developed Family Farm 
in 1945 Did Not Exceed 1500 Gallons Per Day 
Historical circumstances surrounding the stock-watering exemption’s 
enactment reveal that an average family farm required 1500 gpd or less 
in 1945. At the time the Legislature enacted the statute, Washington and 
the United States Bureau of Reclamation were attempting to populate the 
Columbia Basin region with family farms.70 The Columbia Basin Project 
was located below the newly constructed Grand Coulee Dam, in the dry 
eastern region of the state.71 It was the Bureau of Reclamation’s largest 
project, part of its plan to “develop the West through the creation of 
permanent family farms on Federal Reclamation projects.”72 The Bureau 
of Reclamation expected the Columbia Basin Project to strengthen the 
agricultural economy of the Pacific Northwest once post-World War II 
settlers developed the project area with irrigation water provided by the 
Grand Coulee Dam.73 
For settlement to succeed, every rural settler needed a domestic 
supply of water at a minimum cost.74 A 1945 Bureau of Reclamation 
report on farm improvement recommended that the supply of domestic 
                                                     
67. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLUMBIA BASIN JOINT INVESTIGATIONS: FARM 
IMPROVEMENT 54 (1945) [hereinafter FARM IMPROVEMENT]; see also infra Part II.A. 
68. See infra Part II.B. 
69. Legislative intent and the stock-watering exemption’s historical context are analyzed infra, in 
Part V. 
70. See Donald J. Pisani, Federal Reclamation and the American West in the Twentieth Century, 
77 AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 391, 401 (2003). 
71. See U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Columbia Basin Project (1998), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/projects/washington/columbiabasin/history.html (stating the Grand 
Coulee Dam was officially completed Jan. 1, 1942); FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at III 
(stating the Bureau of Reclamation’s goal was to “assure successful settlement and development of 
more than 1,000,000 project acres [below the Grand Coulee Dam] that will be irrigated as soon as 
war conditions permit.”). 
72. Pisani, supra note 70, at 401. 
73. FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at III. 
74. Id. at 53−54. 
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water “should be sufficient (1) to satisfy the personal demands of the 
settlers, including the operation of plumbing facilities; (2) to water 
livestock; (3) to sprinkle lawns and small gardens occasionally; (4) to 
process farm products; and (5) to provide some fire protection.”75 These 
recommended categories parallel the categories codified in 
Washington’s groundwater exemption statute in the same year that the 
Bureau of Reclamation published its report.76 The report also noted that 
because climate and topography in the Columbia Basin limited the use 
of ditches, canals, rivers, and creeks as water sources, groundwater was 
the most promising source for rural development.77 The farm 
improvement report also advised that “total daily requirements of the 
average farm may be only 200 gallons during the early years” and “will 
expand to perhaps 1,500 gallons during the mature development.”78 This 
estimation is consistent with the 1940 Washington Census of Agriculture 
statistics, which reveal that Washington farms at this time were typically 
small farms of 100 acres or less.79 
One year after the Legislature enacted the groundwater code, the 
Department of Conservation published an overview of the groundwater 
code, which described the groundwater exemption statute as: 
INDIVIDUAL DOMESTIC SUPPLY EXEMPT. The Ground 
Water Code exempts from administrative control the withdrawal 
of public ground water for any purpose where the quantity is 
less than 5,000 gallons per day. This exemption was provided to 
relieve the small water user of the formalities and costs of 
obtaining water for his household and domestic needs. Five 
thousand gallons per day will supply ample water for household 
use for a family, their garden and lawn irrigation, and stock 
water.80 
The Department of Conservation interpreted the statute as limiting all 
exempt uses, including stock-watering, to 5000 gpd.81 The agency 
believed the statute’s purpose was to supply “small water users” with 
                                                     
75. Id. at 54. 
76. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006). 
77. FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 54−55. 
78. Id. at 54. The maximum water consumption of “mature development” was calculated based 
on four humans, twenty-four dairy cattle, thirty-three other cattle, twenty-six hogs and pigs, five 
horses, forty-five sheep, and 150 chickens per farm. Id. 
79. See infra Part I.B (comparing 1940 and 2002 Washington Census of Agriculture statistics). 
80. WDCD, supra note 20, at 46 (emphasis added). 
81. See id. 
DUNN_FINAL.DOC 6/10/2008 5:49:37 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 83:249, 2008 
260 
water, and the agency considered 5000 gpd an “ample” amount for such 
users.82 The Department of Conservation’s interpretation limiting all 
exempt uses to 5000 gpd was consistent with the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s estimation that maximum water use for small family 
farms would not exceed 1500 gpd.83 
B. The Industrialization of American Agriculture Since 1945 Has 
Significantly Altered the Structure and Concentration of the 
Livestock Industry 
Since 1945, the livestock industry has experienced rapid 
industrialization and concentration. In recent decades, technological 
advances and horizontal integration have dramatically altered the way 
farms are operated,84 replacing the small-scale family farms that 
historically typified American agriculture with industrialized farming.85 
Technological improvements have steadily increased farming production 
efficiency since the 1930s,86 but when the Legislature enacted the 
groundwater code in 1945, many still did not believe that large-scale 
farming would ever replace the family farm as a staple of American 
agriculture.87 For instance, the Bureau of Reclamation’s mission was to 
                                                     
82. Id. 
83. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 54. 
84. See, e.g., ALEXANDER C. MCGREGOR, COUNTING SHEEP: FROM OPEN RANGE TO 
AGRIBUSINESS ON THE COLUMBIA PLATEAU 322 (1982) (“The livestock business of the Columbia 
Plateau underwent a period of rapid transformation. The number of cattle in the region increased 
rapidly after 1950. . . . Postwar [WWII] improvements in technology and equipment offered definite 
advantages to the large-scale operator.”). See generally Note, Challenging Concentration of Control 
in the American Meat Industry, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2643, 2645−56 (2004) (discussing horizontal 
integration, where smaller farms become absorbed into large factory farms, and vertical integration, 
where meat processors enter into supply contracts and ownership agreements with producers, within 
the meat industry).  
85. See Charles Geisler & Thomas Lyson, The Cumulative Impact of Dairy Industry 
Restructuring, 41 BIOSCIENCE 560, 560 (1991). 
86. See BRUCE L. GARDNER, AMERICAN AGRICULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 10−19 
(2002). 
87. See, e.g., Pisani, supra note 70, at 400 (“[T]he dream of the family farm persisted following 
World War II.”); John M. Brewster, Technological Advance and the Future of the Family Farm, 40 
JOURNAL OF FARM ECONOMICS 1596, 1608 (1958) (“Many believe [the decline of independent 
family farms] has happened in the ‘broiler industry,’ and that we are on the threshold of the same 
thing in cattle, sheep and hogs. Thus a phobia arises that the independent family farm of the corn 
belt and elsewhere is threatened . . . . [However] it will not be easy for ‘integration’ to pull these 
enterprises off well operated family farms with complementary enterprises . . . [f]or producing hogs 
and feeding cattle are much more complicated activities than hatching chicks or raising broilers, 
which were formerly carried on mainly as sidelines by the housewife for pin-money.”). 
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“create and sustain family farms in the West” by providing water with 
reclamation projects,88 like the Grand Coulee Dam and the Columbia 
Basin Project. The vision of a rural West populated by small farms 
persisted from the 1930s into the 1960s, even though this vision 
competed with emerging agricultural businesses and growing cities that 
“created new opportunities for those eager to flee the countryside.”89 
Congress did not raise the acreage limitation on reclamation farms until 
1982, when it raised the limitation from 160 acres to 960 acres. This 
action convinced observers that the Bureau of Reclamation had finally 
abandoned its original family farm mission and endorsed agribusiness.90 
As technology increasingly advanced, engineered livestock 
confinement facilities became widespread between the 1960s and 1980s, 
replacing traditional pasture methods and leading to a concentration of 
livestock on industrialized farms.91 From the 1950s to the 1990s, the 
number of farms in the United States decreased by fifty percent,92 and 
concentrated livestock operations more than doubled between 1982 and 
1997.93 As recently as 1987, a typical dairy herd had fewer than seventy-
two cows, but now large dairy farms with 500 or more cows are the 
fastest growing segment of the dairy industry in the western states.94 
Washington agriculture statistics also reflect this trend of declining 
farms numbers and increasing farm size.95 In 1940, Washington State 
had approximately 81,600 farms, and the majority of those farms were 
                                                     
88. Pisani, supra note 70, at 391. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 403. 
91. See, e.g., LYLE P. SCHERTZ ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANOTHER REVOLUTION IN U.S. 
FARMING? 85 (1979) (“Cattle feeding has shifted to very large commercial feedlot operations using: 
(1) highly specialized . . . technology and (2) industrialized approaches to management.”); id. at 119 
(“[T]he number of commercial dairy farms declined from [1950 to 1979] . . . . Conversely, average 
herd size on commercial farms more than doubled during the same period.”) id. at 190 (“Advances 
in technology have permitted . . . hogs to be produced successfully without pasture. Hogs are 
produced year-round in low-labor, capital-intensive systems conducive to large-scale production.”); 
A.G. Mueller, Impact of Changing Technology on Livestock Systems, ILLINOIS AGRICULTURAL 
ECONOMICS, July 1971, at 1, 5 (“Rapid progress in engineered confinement systems in recent years 
has been related to the need to make scarce labor resources more productive.”). 
92. See Geisler & Lyson, supra note 85, at 560. 
93. See NOEL GOLLEHON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CONFINED ANIMAL PRODUCTION AND 
MANURE NUTRIENTS 11 (2001), available at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib771/aib771e.pdf. 
94. See Geisler & Lyson, supra note 85, at 560−61. 
95. See SCHERTZ ET AL., supra note 91, at 404. 
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100 acres or less in size.96 The total number of livestock was 
approximately 1,500,000, with cattle representing about half that number 
and sheep comprising most of the other half.97 In contrast, by 2002 
Washington had approximately 36,000 farms with an average size of 
430 acres.98 Census statistics classified about one third of the farms as 
livestock industries.99 Additionally, the total number of livestock in 2002 
amounted to approximately 1,300,000, including 1,100,000 cattle.100 As 
these statistics reveal, livestock numbers have not significantly 
decreased since the 1940s, but they have become concentrated on half 
the number of farms. At the same time, livestock demographics have 
shifted to predominantly cattle.101  
This shift in demographics is significant because of the difference in 
the amount of water consumed by cows and smaller livestock. In a 
temperate climate, beef cattle consume about twelve gallons of water per 
day, and dairy cows consume about thirty-five gallons.102 In contrast, 
sheep and goats consume one to four gallons per day.103 An increasing 
concentration of cows leads to higher daily water consumption. For 
example, in 2006 Washington State had approximately 490 dairy farms, 
                                                     
96. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: PACIFIC DIVISION 536 (1940), 
available at http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/Historical_Publications/1940/ 
Farm%20and%20Farm%20Property%20Mountain%20and%20Pacific/00179375v1p6ch6.pdf 
[hereinafter 1940 CENSUS]. 
97. Id. at 537 (total number cattle and calves was 698,468; sheep and lambs, 487,256; horses and 
mules, 134,902; and hogs and pigs, 174,570 in 1940; poultry not included in total livestock 
calculation). 
98. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE: WASHINGTON 48 (2002), available at 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census02/volume1/wa/WAVolume104.pdf [hereinafter 2002 
CENSUS]. 
99. Id. at 62 (11,105 farms classified as livestock industries in 2002, excluding “animal 
aquaculture” industry). 
100. Id. at 62, 64 (total number of cattle and calves was 1,100,181; hogs and pigs, 30,289; sheep 
and lambs, 58,470; horses and ponies, 75,951; goats, 23,217 in 2002; poultry was not included in 
total livestock calculation). 
101. See id. at 62, 64 (total number of cattle and calves was 698,468 in 1940 and 1,100,181 in 
2002). 
102. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL RANGE AND PASTURE HANDBOOK 6−12 (2003), available 
at http://policy.nrcs.usda.gov/media/pdf/H_190_NRPH_6.pdf [hereinafter PASTURE HANDBOOK]; 
Dairy Farmers of Washington, From Grass to Glass, http://www.havemilk.com/article.asp?id=1480 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2008). 
103. See PASTURE HANDBOOK, supra note 102, at 6−12. See generally C. L. HAMILTON & HANS 
G. JEPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., STOCK-WATER DEVELOPMENTS: WELLS, SPRINGS, AND PONDS 
5−6 (1940) (discussing variations in stock-water requirements by breed, season, etc.). 
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with an average herd size of 475 cows per farm.104 If each dairy cow 
consumed thirty-five gallons of water per day,105 the total average daily 
consumption per dairy farm was approximately 16,625 gpd. 
In short, when Washington’s Legislature enacted the groundwater 
code in 1945, the state was encouraging family farm development in the 
Columbia Basin and needed to provide water for settlers at minimum 
cost.106 At that time, the average fully developed farm required less than 
1500 gallons of water per day.107 One year after the exemption statute 
was enacted, the Department of Conservation concluded that it limited 
all withdrawals to an “ample” amount of 5000 gpd.108 Since the statute’s 
enactment, however, the industrialization of the livestock industry has 
decreased the number of farms in Washington and increased farm size, 
concentrating a greater number of livestock onto fewer farms and 
thereby increasing the amount of water a single livestock farm is capable 
of using.109 
III. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE STOCK-
WATERING EXEMPTION HAVE CAUSED A DISPUTE OVER 
WHETHER IT IS LIMITED OR UNLIMITED IN QUANTITY 
Ecology, the PCHB, and the Attorney General have interpreted the 
stock-watering exemption and arrived at conflicting conclusions. The 
agencies dispute whether the exemption is limited or unlimited.110 
Ecology originally limited the stock-watering exemption to 5000 gpd 
based on the overall structure of the groundwater code and the statute’s 
                                                     
104. See Dairy Farmers of Washington, Facts About the Washington Dairy Industry, 
http://www.havemilk.com/article.asp?id=2142 (last visited Mar. 6, 2008). 
105. See Dairy Farmers of Washington, From Grass to Glass, 
http://www.havemilk.com/article.asp?id=1480 (last visited Mar. 6, 2008). 
106. FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at III, 53−54. 
107. Id. at 54. 
108. WDCD, supra note 20, at 46. 
109. See supra Part II.B. 
110. These three state agencies are related to each other in the following manner. Ecology 
administers and enforces groundwater permits. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.44.035(1), 90.44.050 
(2006). The PCHB reviews Ecology decisions and orders, including decisions about groundwater 
permits. Id. § 43.21B.010. Ecology actions may be appealed to the PCHB, and PCHB final 
decisions may be appealed to the superior court. Id. §§ 43.21B.230 (appeals to PCHB); 43.21B.190 
(appeals to superior court). The Attorney General represents Ecology in all court actions and 
proceedings. Id. § 43.10.030(3). The Attorney General also provides written opinions on legal 
questions to state officers when requested. Id. § 43.10.03(5), (7). 
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historical context.111 The PCHB upheld this interpretation in a dispute 
between a dairy farm and Ecology in 2001,112 but in 2005, the Attorney 
General issued an opinion concluding that the stock-watering exemption 
is unlimited.113 Ecology subsequently changed its practices to conform 
to the Attorney General’s opinion.114 
A. The Department of Ecology Originally Interpreted the Stock-
watering Exemption as Limited to 5000 Gallons Per Day 
Ecology, the agency responsible for administering the groundwater 
code, originally interpreted the stock-watering exemption as limited to 
5000 gpd.115 The agency based its interpretation on the language of the 
two provisos that describe all exempt uses as “small withdrawals”116 
“not exceeding five thousand gallons per day.”117 Also, the groundwater 
code specifically states that no existing surface water rights “shall be 
affected or impaired by any of the provisions of this supplementary 
chapter.”118 Ecology reasoned that this indicates the groundwater 
exemption provision is not unlimited, because unlimited withdrawals 
could potentially impair senior surface water users.119 Ecology also 
relied on the Department of Conservation’s 1946 interpretation that 
stock-water withdrawals were limited to 5000 gpd,120 and a 1942 report 
on domestic water supply by the Washington State Planning Council 
indicating that total farm demand for domestic and stock-water was 
expected to be 1500 gpd.121 For these reasons, Ecology concluded that 
                                                     
111. See Dep’t of Ecology’s Motion for Summary Judgment, PCHB 01-073 (PCHB Aug. 20, 
2001), at 7−14 (on file with author); DeVries v. Dep’t of Ecology, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV 
LEXIS 46, at *7 (Sept. 27, 2001). 
112. DeVries, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46, at *16−19. 
113. See 2005 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 17, 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=5872. 
114. See Ecology Press Release, supra note 9. 
115. See id. (quoting Ecology Director Jay Manning, “Ecology had consistently interpreted the 
livestock watering exemption as limited to 5,000 gallons a day”); Dep’t of Ecology’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, PCHB 01-073 (PCHB Aug. 20, 2001), at 7−14 (on file with author). 
116. See DeVries, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46, at *7; Dep’t of Ecology’s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, PCHB 01-073 (Aug. 20, 2001), at 8−10 (on file with author). 
117. See DeVries, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46 at *8. 
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.030 (2006) (emphasis added). 
119. See Dep’t of Ecology’s Motion for Summary Judgment, PCHB 01-073 (Aug. 20, 2001), at 
10 (on file with author). 
120. See id. at 12. 
121. Id. The 1942 Washington State Planning Council report was later incorporated into the 1945 
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stock-watering withdrawals are limited to 5000 gpd under the exemption 
statute and large livestock operations, such as cattle feedlots and 
commercial dairies, may not use the statute to withdraw unlimited 
groundwater for stock-watering purposes.122 
B. The PCHB Also Interpreted the Stock-Watering Exemption as 
Limited to 5000 Gallons Per Day 
In a 2001 case, the PCHB agreed with Ecology that the stock-
watering exemption is limited to 5000 gpd.123 In DeVries v. Department 
of Ecology, a dairy farm relied on the stock-watering exemption to 
withdraw between 39,000 to 56,000 gpd for its herd of 2261 dairy 
cows.124 The herd was expected to eventually reach 4400 cows, 
consuming about 110,000 gallons of water per day.125 When Ecology 
ordered the dairy to restrict its groundwater use to 5000 gpd until it 
obtained a permit to withdraw more, DeVries appealed to the PCHB, 
arguing that the plain language of the exemption allows unlimited 
withdrawals for stock-watering.126 The PCHB concluded that the stock-
watering exemption is limited to 5000 gpd.127 
The PCHB reasoned that the first proviso indicates the Legislature 
intended to limit all exemptions to “small withdrawals,” and the second 
proviso defines small withdrawals as “not exceeding five thousand 
gallons per day.”128 The PCHB also reasoned that canons of statutory 
construction support this interpretation.129 The PCHB described the 
general permitting requirement as “the central purpose of the 1945 
groundwater code.”130 Under the rule of narrowly construing exceptions 
                                                     
Bureau of Reclamation’s report. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at V. 
122. See Kim v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 115 Wash. App. 157, 160−61, 61 P.3d 1211, 
1212−13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting a 1995 Ecology document explaining Ecology’s 
interpretation of the exemption statute); Dep’t of Ecology’s Motion for Summary Judgment, PCHB 
01-073 (Aug. 20, 2001), at 7−14 (on file with author). 
123. See DeVries v. Dep’t of Ecology, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46, at *21 (Sept. 
27, 2001) (granting summary judgment to Ecology on issue of whether the exemption statute limits 
stock-watering to 5000 gpd). 
124. Id. at *8−9. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at *1, 7. 
127. Id. at *21 (granting summary judgment to Ecology). 
128. Id. at *6−7 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006)). 
129. Id. at *11−12, 14. 
130. Id. at *5, 20. 
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to give full effect to a general provision, the PCHB concluded that it 
should narrowly construe the stock-watering exemption to give full 
effect to the general permitting requirement.131 Furthermore, under the 
rule of avoiding literal readings if they produce absurd consequences, 
the PCHB concluded that “[a]ll of the objectives of the groundwater 
code would be undermined if the stockwatering exemption is for an 
unlimited quantity,” because “an unlimited, and uncontrollable, potential 
for withdrawal of groundwater” could potentially have a “devastating 
effect on the ability of the state to protect the senior water right holders 
or to grant future water rights.”132 
C. The Attorney General Interpreted the Stock-Watering Exemption as 
Unlimited and Ecology Subsequently Changed its Interpretation 
The Attorney General issued a formal opinion in 2005 interpreting the 
stock-watering exemption as unlimited.133 When Washington cattle 
ranchers reported being turned down for financing because of the 5000 
gpd limit Ecology was imposing on exempt stock-watering withdrawals, 
two legislators from eastern Washington requested an opinion from the 
Washington State Attorney General.134 Although Attorney General 
opinions are advisory in character and do not bind state officers,135  
“officials are entitled to [the Attorney General’s] opinion before they do 
anything as they are not protected [from civil liability] if acting without 
the advice of their duly constituted legal adviser.”136 If an official 
disregards an Attorney General opinion, “they do so at their own 
peril.”137 
Because the stock-watering provision is the only exemption that is not 
immediately qualified by a limitation,138 the Attorney General concluded 
                                                     
131. Id. at *5, 20. 
132. Id. at *17−18. 
133. See 2005 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 17, 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=5872. 
134. Bob Hoff, Ecology to Respect Stock Water Opinion, FARM BUREAU REPORT, Nov. 30, 2005, 
available at http://www.aginfo.com/AgInfoReportView.cfm?Story=5714. 
135. See 1923−24 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. 197, 201 (1924). 
136. 1935−36 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. 86, 87 (1936). See also State v. Hood, 93 Wash. 2d 603, 
607, 611 P.2d 758, 760 (1980) (“State officials who take official action in accordance with the 
advice of the Attorney General are protected from liability in connection therewith.”) (quoting State 
v. Martin, 64 Wash. 2d 511, 520, 392 P.2d 435, 441 (1964)). 
137. 1935−36 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. 86, 88 (1936). 
138. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006). 
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that the plain language of the statute does not limit stock-watering 
withdrawals based on ordinary rules of language and grammar.139 While 
the Attorney General acknowledged Ecology’s argument that an 
unlimited exemption is “inherently inconsistent with the general policy 
of requiring permits for groundwater withdrawals in order to provide for 
an orderly and consistent administration of an important and limited 
public resource,” he noted that Ecology could alternatively require 
information on the use of exempted withdrawals for use in its 
administrative and enforcement decisions.140 
Shortly after the Attorney General issued this opinion, Ecology issued 
a press release stating that even though it “had consistently interpreted 
the livestock watering exemption as limited to 5,000 gallons a day,” the 
agency would change its practices to conform to the new legal guidance 
provided by the Attorney General, and “will not take any action to limit 
groundwater use under the stock-water exemption to 5,000 gpd.”141 
IV. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF STATUTORY INTEPRETATION IN 
WASHINGTON IS TO ASCERTAIN AND IMPLEMENT THE 
LEGISLATURE’S INTENT 
The stock-watering exemption must be interpreted in accordance with 
Washington’s principles of statutory interpretation. A court’s 
fundamental objective in statutory interpretation is to implement the 
Legislature’s intent.142 Courts first analyze the plain meaning of a 
disputed statutory provision based on its text and the context of related 
                                                     
139. 2005 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 17, 3−4 (2005), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=5872. It is interesting to note that this 
opinion conflicts with a 1997 Attorney General opinion interpreting the exemption statute as 
allowing “very small withdrawals” that are “unlikely to have a significant impact on the water 
system.” 1997 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 6, 6 (1997), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=9200. The 1997 opinion also states that 
“[i]f the exemption is read broadly, a significant amount of water might be withdrawn by a property 
‘outside’ the regulated water system, undercutting the central purpose for enacting the water code.” 
Id. at 7. Although the 1997 opinion was interpreting the domestic use exemption and not the stock-
watering exemption, the opinion’s arguments in favor of limiting the groundwater exemptions to 
very small withdrawals might undermine the amount of deference a court gives to the 2005 
opinion’s broad interpretation of the stock-watering exemption. 
140. 2005 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 17, 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=5872. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 
(2006). 
141. Ecology Press Release, supra note 9. 
142. See Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9−10, 43 P.3d 4, 9 (2002) 
(citing State v. J.M., 144 Wash. 2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720, 724 (2001)). 
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statutes.143 A “plain” meaning based on literal or express wording may 
be restricted, however, if it does not implement the Legislature’s intent 
and impairs the spirit or purpose of an enactment.144 If the statute 
remains ambiguous after conducting a plain meaning analysis, then 
courts may resolve the ambiguity by examining a statute’s legislative 
history and the circumstances surrounding its enactment to determine 
legislative intent.145 When a statute is ambiguous, courts may also 
consider the public policies underlying the statute.146 
A. Washington Courts First Analyze the Plain Meaning of a Statute to 
Ascertain the Legislature’s Intent 
A court’s fundamental objective in statutory interpretation is 
ascertaining and implementing the Legislature’s intent.147 The first step 
in statutory interpretation is to look to the text of the statute, and if the 
statute’s meaning is plain, then courts must give effect to that plain 
meaning as an expression of the Legislature’s intent.148 Although 
Washington courts previously looked only to the disputed statutory 
provision when analyzing the plain meaning of a statute, the Washington 
State Supreme Court recently expanded the analysis in Department of 
Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn149 to include “all that the Legislature has 
said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent 
                                                     
143. Id. at 11, 43 P.3d at 10 (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 48A:16 (6th ed. 2000)). 
144. See State v. Robinson, 67 Wash. 425, 432−33, 121 P. 848, 851 (1912) (citing Barto v. 
Stewart, 21 Wash. 605, 615−16, 59 P. 480, 482 (1899)) (“When the object and general intent of a 
statute are ascertained, general words may be restrained to it, and those of narrower import may be 
expanded to effectuate that intent.”); Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand 
Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 Wash. 2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655, 663 (2002) (citing State v. 
Day, 96 Wash. 2d 646, 648, 638 P.2d 546, 547 (1981)) (“The spirit or purpose of an enactment 
should prevail over . . . express but inept wording.”); In re Parentage of J.M.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 
387, 119 P.3d 840, 846 (2005) (“Strained, unlikely or absurd consequences resulting from a literal 
reading are to be avoided.”). 
145. See Rest. Dev. Inc., v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash. 2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598, 602 (2003) 
(discussing legislative history and historical circumstances); State v. Costich, 152 Wash. 2d 463, 
477, 98 P.3d 795, 802 (2004) (discussing historical circumstances). 
146. See In re Estate of Hastings, 88 Wash. 2d 788, 793, 567 P.2d 200, 202 (1977) (“[I]n passing 
on the meaning of any legislative enactment, we look to the language of the statute [and] the policy 
behind it . . . .”). 
147. See Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9−10, 43 P.3d 4, 9 (2002) 
(citing State v. J.M., 144 Wash. 2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720, 724 (2001)). 
148. Id. 
149. 146 Wash. 2d 1, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). 
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about the provision in question.”150 Washington’s expanded plain 
meaning rule mandates that courts consider every word within the text of 
the disputed statute, as well as the context of related statutes and the 
integrity of the overall statutory scheme.151 For example, where a 
disputed provision is an exception to a general rule, context suggests that 
a court should interpret the exception narrowly.152 
Although courts often do not clearly explain how they have arrived at 
their conclusion that a statute’s meaning is plain,153 their rationale 
becomes clearer when the reader remembers that a court’s primary goal 
in statutory interpretation is ascertaining and implementing the 
Legislature’s intent. For this reason, courts avoid literal interpretations if 
they do not implement the Legislature’s intent. A statute’s plain meaning 
should not be based on “literal” wording if it produces “[s]trained, 
unlikely, or absurd consequences.”154 Rather, “the purpose of an 
enactment should prevail over express but inept wording.”155 Once a 
court has ascertained the Legislature’s intent, “general words [within the 
statute] may be restrained to [the general intent], and those of narrower 
import may be expanded to effectuate that intent.”156 
                                                     
150. Id. at 11−12, 43 P.3d at 10. 
151. See id.; City of Olympia v. Drebick, 156 Wash. 2d 289, 295, 126 P.3d 802, 804 (2006). 
152. See State v. Christensen, 18 Wash. 2d 7, 19, 137 P.2d 512, 518 (1943); Monroe Calculating 
Mach. Co. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 11 Wash. 2d 636, 644, 120 P.2d 466, 470 (1941); see also 
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 47:11 (7th ed. 2007) 
(“[W]here a general provision in a statute has certain limited exceptions, all doubts should be 
resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions.”). 
153. See Philip A. Talmadge, A New Approach to Statutory Interpretation in Washington, 25 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 179, 191 (2001). 
154. In re Parentage of J.M.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 387, 119 P.3d 840, 846 (2005). The rule of 
avoiding absurd consequences has been described as the rule of statutory interpretation that “trumps 
every other rule.” Davis v. Dep’t of Licensing, 137 Wash. 2d 957, 971, 977 P.2d 554, 560 (1999). 
155. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash. 2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303, 1308 
(1996). 
156. State v. Robinson, 67 Wash. 425, 432−33, 121 P. 848, 851 (1912) (citing Barto v. Stewart, 
21 Wash. 605, 615−16, 59 P. 480, 482 (1899)); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES & 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §§ 48A:16, 48A:17 (6th ed. 2000) (stating in certain situations it is 
proper not to interpret a statute according to its apparent plain meaning, such as when the legislature 
never contemplated the problem before the court or when extrinsic aids demonstrate another 
meaning is more consistent with the legislature’s intent). But see Amalgamated Transit Union 
Legislative Council of Wash. State v. State, 145 Wash. 2d 544, 560, 40 P.3d 656, 663 (2002) 
(quoting Sundquist Homes Inc. v. Snohomish Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 140 Wash. 2d 403, 416, 997 
P.2d 915, 921 (2000) (Sanders, J., dissenting)) (“[I]t is the legislature’s job⎯not ours⎯to stem the 
tide of potential absurd results that might result from impartially applying the plain meaning of 
statutory language.”). 
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For example, in Department of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn the 
Washington State Supreme Court applied the plain meaning rule to the 
groundwater exemption statute addressed by this Comment.157 The 
statutory provision at issue was the domestic use exemption, which 
exempts “any withdrawal . . . for single or group domestic uses in an 
amount not exceeding five thousand gallons a day.”158 The court was 
asked to determine whether a residential subdivision developer could use 
the exemption to drill multiple wells that would individually withdraw 
less than 5000 gpd but would collectively withdraw more than 5000 
gpd.159 The court considered whether the plain meaning of the words 
“any withdrawal” in the exemption statute is “every or all removals of 
water,”160 and determined that “[n]either term, in and of itself, defines 
the scope of the right . . . and the words ‘any withdrawal’ do not 
establish the plain meaning of the exemption.”161 When the parties 
disputed the potential impact of interpreting the exemption to apply to 
each individual well, the court stated that “[t]he question is more basic, 
i.e., whether the Legislature even contemplated the possibility that 
developments of the size in this case, or even larger, would be entitled to 
exempt withdrawals of 5,000 gpd for each of their lots.”162 The court 
concluded that “[g]iven the limitation on [domestic] uses, and the overall 
goal of regulation to assure protection of existing rights and the public 
interest, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend that possibility 
when this statute was enacted.”163 The court went on to hold that the 
plain meaning of the domestic use exemption, as determined by the 
context of related statutory provisions, limited the developer to one 5000 
gpd withdrawal for the entire project.164 As Campbell & Gwinn 
demonstrates, the plain meaning analysis requires a court to ascertain 
and implement the meaning that the Legislature intended when the 
statute was enacted.165 
                                                     
157. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 4, 43 P.3d at 6; WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 
(2006). 
158. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 4, 43 P.3d at 6 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 
(2006)). 
159. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 4, 43 P.3d at 6. 
160. Id. at 14−15, 43 P.3d at 12. 
161. Id. at 16, 43 P.3d at 12. 
162. Id. at 16−17, 43 P.3d at 13.  
163. Id. at 17, 43 P.3d at 13.  
164. Id. at 21, 43 P.3d at 15. 
165. See also Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 615, 196 P. 13, 15 (1921) (quoting Bloomer v. Todd, 
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B. Washington Courts May Consider Legislative History, Historical 
Context, Agency Interpretations, and Policy Considerations if a 
Statute is Ambiguous 
If a statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning 
under the plain meaning analysis, then courts may look to sources 
outside of the statute’s text to ascertain the Legislature’s intent.166 
Washington courts have held that ambiguity exists when multiple 
interpretations are reasonable, not merely conceivable.167 In other 
words, ambiguity exists when a reasonably well-informed person is 
capable of understanding a statute in two or more different senses.168 
Where a statute is ambiguous, Washington courts may look to the 
legislative history of a statute, the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment, and contemporaneous interpretations of the statute to 
determine legislative intent.169 Legislative history includes hearings, 
committee reports, and floor debates.170 Historical context includes 
circumstances leading up to and surrounding a statute’s enactment.171 
Courts look to the historical context in which the Legislature enacted a 
statute to identify the problem the Legislature intended the statute to 
                                                     
3 Wash. Terr. 599, 615, 19 P. 135, 139 (1888)) (“The ordinary use of words at the time when 
used[,] and the meaning adopted at that time, is usually the best guide for ascertaining legislative 
intent, as it is always the intent of any written instrument or law at the time it was made that is to 
govern in enforcing it.”). 
166. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 12, 43 P.3d at 10; Rest. Dev. Inc., v. Cananwill, 
Inc., 150 Wash. 2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598, 602 (2003). 
167. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order 
of Eagles, 148 Wash. 2d 224, 242, 59 P.3d 655, 664 (2002) (“[A] statute is not necessarily 
ambiguous simply because of two different interpretations. The question . . . is whether those 
interpretations are sufficiently reasonable to warrant further inquiry.”). 
168. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.2 (7th ed. 
2007). 
169. See Bernard v. Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 194−95, 108 P. 439, 441 (1910) (discussing 
contemporaneous construction); Rest. Dev., 150 Wash. 2d at 682, 80 P.3d at 602 (discussing 
legislative history and historical circumstances); State v. Costich, 152 Wash. 2d 463, 477, 98 P.3d 
795, 802 (2004) (discussing historical circumstances). 
170. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (7th. ed. 1999). Unfortunately, there is very little record 
of the legislative history for the groundwater code. The groundwater code was introduced as House 
Bill 536 into the House and the Senate on February 26, 1945, and was passed by March 8, 1945. See 
WASHINGTON STATE LEGISLATURE, HOUSE JOURNAL 425, 623, 878 (1945); WASHINGTON STATE 
LEGISLATURE, SENATE JOURNAL 367, 783, 895 (1945). There are no committee reports or records of 
floor debates available. 
171. See Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 615, 196 P. 13, 15 (quoting Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. 
Terr. 599, 615, 19 P. 135, 139); Wash. State Nurses Ass’n v. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 93 Wash. 2d 
117, 121, 605 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1980); Costich, 152 Wash. 2d at 477, 98 P.3d at 802. 
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solve and ascertain the Legislature’s purpose for enacting the statute.172 
Even where a statute is not ambiguous, the Washington State Supreme 
Court has used historical circumstances to support the plain meaning of 
the statute. For instance, in Restaurant Development Inc. v. Cananwill 
Inc.,173 the court determined that the plain meaning of the Insurance 
Premium Finance Company Act instructs insurance companies to 
calculate service charges by using an “add-on” method, and then 
discussed circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute in 
1969 to support its plain meaning interpretation.174 
When a statute is ambiguous, courts may also defer to 
contemporaneous agency interpretations of the statute. The reason for 
this is not because the agency interpretation is evidence of legislative 
intent, but because Washington courts have a policy of deferring to 
agency interpretations when (1) a statute is ambiguous, (2) the agency is 
charged with enforcing the statute, and (3) the agency has special 
expertise in the statute’s subject matter.175 Attorney General 
interpretations are also accorded “considerable weight” if a statute is 
ambiguous,176 although the Washington State Supreme Court recently 
stated that it “give[s] little deference to [A]ttorney [G]eneral opinions on 
issues of statutory construction.”177 Washington courts have not 
indicated which interpretation receives greater deference when the 
Attorney General and an agency disagree.178 
                                                     
172. See State Nurses Ass’n, 93 Wash. 2d at 121, 605 P.2d at 1271. 
173. 150 Wash. 2d 674, 80 P.3d 598 (2003). 
174. Id. at 687, 80 P.3d at 604. 
175. See Bostain v. Food Exp. Inc., 159 Wash. 2d 700, 716, 153 P.3d 846, 854 (2007); Port of 
Seattle v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 151 Wash. 2d 568, 593, 90 P.3d 659, 672 (2004). When 
the PCHB and Ecology disagree on the interpretation of a statute within Ecology’s expertise, courts 
will defer to Ecology. See Port of Seattle, 151 Wash. 2d at 594, 90 P.3d at 672. PCHB statutory 
interpretations are not entitled to deference and are reviewed de novo. See id. at 587−88, 90 P.3d at 
669−70. 
176. See Davis v. County of King, 77 Wash. 2d 930, 933, 468 P.2d 679, 681 (1970); In re Elec. 
Lightwave Inc., 123 Wash. 2d 530, 542, 869 P.2d 1045, 1052 (1994). 
177. Amalgamated Transit Union Legislative Council of Wash. State v. State, 145 Wash. 2d 544, 
554, 40 P.3d 656, 660 (2002); see also Elec. Lightwave Inc., 123 Wash. 2d at 542, 869 P.2d at 1052 
(“[Attorney general opinions] are entitled to less deference when statutory interpretation is at 
issue.”). 
178. This issue has not been addressed by any Washington cases, which is likely due to the fact 
that the Attorney General represents state agencies in court. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.030(3) 
(2006). Therefore, the interpretation forwarded in court is always the Attorney General’s 
interpretation, not the agency’s.  
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Finally, where a public interest is affected, an interpretation that 
favors the public and implements the public policy underlying the 
statutory provision is preferred.179 Public policy is found by examining 
the history, purpose, language, and effect of the statute.180 Generally 
courts only use public policy to resolve ambiguous statutes because of 
the indefinite nature of “public policy.”181 Washington courts have stated 
that a “paramount concern” when interpreting a statute is ensuring that 
“the interpretation is consistent with the underlying policy of the 
statute.”182 Courts cannot amend statutes that changing societal 
conditions have rendered obsolete.183 Rather, where two reasonable 
interpretations of a statute exist, a court should adopt the interpretation 
that better advances the overall legislative purpose and policy behind the 
statute.184 
For example, in In re Hastings185 the Washington State Supreme 
Court said, “[I]n passing on the meaning of any legislative enactment, 
we look to the language of the statute [and] the policy behind it.”186 The 
court then examined the history of Washington’s pretermitted heir 
statute and interpretations of similar statutes in other jurisdictions to 
determine the policy underlying the act.187 Once the Hastings court 
determined that the underlying policy was to protect heirs who are 
omitted from a will due to the failing mind of an elderly testator, the 
court held that it must “construe [the statute] in a way that is ‘consonant 
with the obvious purpose’” and declined to extend the statute to include 
children who were omitted because they had predeceased the testator.188 
Overall, a court’s fundamental objective in statutory interpretation is 
to ascertain and implement the Legislature’s intent.189 Washington courts 
                                                     




182.  Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Marr, 54 Wash. App. 589, 593, 774 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1989) (citing 
Safeco Ins. Cos. v. Meyering, 102 Wash. 2d 385, 392, 687 P.2d 195, 200 (1984)). 
183. See Kim v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 115 Wash. App. 157, 163, 61 P.3d 1211, 1214 
(2003). 
184. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 86 Wash. 2d 310, 321, 545 P.2d 5, 12 (1976). 
185. 88 Wash. 2d 788, 567 P.2d 200 (1977). 
186. Id. at 793, 567 P.2d at 202. 
187. Id. at 793−96, 567 P.2d at 202−04. 
188. Id. at 795, 567 P.2d at 204 (quoting Gehlen v. Gehlen, 77 Wash. 17, 24, 137 P. 312, 315 
(1913)). 
189. See Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 9−10, 43 P.3d 4, 9 (2002) 
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first attempt to ascertain this intent by analyzing the plain meaning of a 
statute.190 If the statute is ambiguous, Washington courts may examine 
the legislative history of a statute, historical circumstances surrounding 
its enactment, and contemporaneous interpretations to determine the 
Legislature’s intent.191 Courts may also defer to agency interpretations or 
examine a statute’s underlying public policy when interpreting an 
ambiguous statute.192 
V. WASHINGTON’S STOCK-WATERING EXEMPTION IS 
LIMITED TO 5000 GALLONS PER DAY BASED ON THE 
TEXT AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE STATUTE 
The proper interpretation of the stock-watering exemption begins with 
a plain meaning analysis of the statute, bearing in mind that the ultimate 
goal is ascertaining and implementing the Legislature’s intent.193 The 
text of the exemption statute and the context of related statutory 
provisions within the groundwater code reveal that the enacting 
Legislature did not intend to create an unlimited stock-watering 
exemption. Rather, the Legislature instead intended to limit exempt 
withdrawals of groundwater to 5000 gpd.194 Even if the text and context 
of the statute did not clearly support limiting the exemption, the 
historical circumstances surrounding the statute’s enactment and the 
groundwater code’s underlying public policy further support limiting 
stock-watering withdrawals to 5000 gpd.195  
                                                     
(citing State v. J.M., 144 Wash. 2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720, 724 (2001)). 
190. Id. at 9−10, 43 P.3d at 9. 
191. See State v. Costich, 152 Wash. 2d 463, 477, 98 P.3d 795, 802 (2004) (discussing historical 
circumstances); Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash. 2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598, 602 (2003) 
(discussing legislative history and historical circumstances); Bernard v. Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 
194−95, 108 P. 439, 441 (1910) (discussing contemporaneous construction).  
192. See Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 159 Wash. 2d 700, 716, 153 P.3d 846, 854 (2007) 
(agency interpretation); In re Hastings, 88 Wash. 2d 788, 793, 567 P.2d 200, 202 (1977) (public 
policy). 
193. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 9−10, 43 P.3d at 9. 
194. See infra Part V.A. 
195. See infra Part V.B & V.C. 
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A. The Text and Context of the Exemption Statute Indicate That the 
Legislature Intended to Limit the Stock-Watering Exemption to 
5000 Gallons Per Day 
The stock-watering exemption is a limited exemption according to the 
plain meaning of the statute. Although the text of the stock-watering 
provision indicates the exemption is unlimited when standing alone,196 
the context of related statutes support narrowly construing the 
exemption.197 Furthermore, the context of the exemption statute shows 
that 5000 gpd is the proper quantity for the limitation.198 
i.  The Text of the Stock-Watering Provision Supports an Unlimited 
Interpretation When Considered in Isolation 
A plain meaning analysis of the statute begins with the text of the 
stock-watering exemption, which states that “any withdrawal of public 
ground waters for stock-watering purposes . . . shall be exempt from the 
provisions of this section.”199 If the analysis were limited to this 
provision, it would be easy to conclude that the statute exempts 
unlimited withdrawals for livestock based on the ordinary meaning of 
the words “any withdrawal.” However, the Washington State Supreme 
Court has already considered whether the phrase “any withdrawal” 
within the exemption statute defines the scope of an exemption, and in 
Campbell & Gwinn the court held that the words did not define the 
scope of the domestic use exemption.200 The expanded plain meaning 
rule that was adopted in Campbell & Gwinn allowed the court to look 
beyond the disputed statutory provision and rely on the context of the 
entire statute and related statutory provisions to determine the proper 
scope of the domestic use exemption.201 Since the Campbell & Gwinn 
court was interpreting the same phrase—“any withdrawal”—within the 
same statute,202 courts should apply the same interpretation to the stock-
                                                     
196. See infra Part V.A.i & V.A.ii. 
197. See infra Part V.A.iii. 
198. See infra Part V.A.iv. 
199. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006) (emphasis added); see supra Part I.B for full text of 
the statute. 
200. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 16, 43 P.3d 4, 12 (2002). 
201. See id. at 14−16, 43 P.3d at 12−13 (primarily relying on provisions concerning the 
construction of wells). 
202. See id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. 
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watering exemption. Thus, courts must discern the scope of the stock-
watering exemption from the text and context of the entire statute, and 
cannot define the statute’s scope solely by the ordinary meaning of the 
words “any withdrawal.” 
ii. The Context of the Exemption Provision Also Supports an 
Unlimited Interpretation of the Stock-Watering Exemption 
The first level of context for the stock-watering provision is the 
context of the entire exemption provision. The exemption provision 
provides that any withdrawal for (1) stock-watering, (2) lawn and 
noncommercial garden irrigation one half acre or less, (3) single or 
group domestic uses 5000 gpd or less, or (4) industrial uses 5000 gpd or 
less, is exempt from the general permitting requirement.203 Because 
stock-watering is the only exempt withdrawal that is not immediately 
qualified by a limitation, it would appear that the Legislature intended 
stock-watering withdrawals to be unlimited. However, courts should 
avoid literal readings if they lead to absurd consequences.204 In a case 
such as DeVries v. Department of Ecology, allowing a dairy farm to 
withdraw up to 100,000 gpd under the stock-watering exemption is an 
absurd result based on the dramatic disparity between such a withdrawal 
and the other exempt withdrawals, which are limited to one half acre of 
irrigation or 5000 gpd.205 To resolve the inconsistency between the 
structure of the exemption provision, which appears to allow unlimited 
withdrawals for stock-watering, and the absurd results produced by such 
an interpretation, it is necessary to examine the broader context of the 
entire exemption statute and other statutes within the groundwater code. 
                                                     
203. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. 
204. See In re Parentage of J.M.K., 155 Wash. 2d 374, 387, 119 P.3d 840, 846 (2005) (“Strained, 
unlikely or absurd consequences resulting from a literal reading are to be avoided.”); see also 
Fraternal Order of Eagles, Tenino Aerie No. 564 v. Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 148 
Wash. 2d 224, 239, 59 P.3d 655, 663 (2002) (citing State v. Day, 96 Wash. 2d 646, 648, 638 P.2d 
546, 547 (1981)) (“The spirit or purpose of an enactment should prevail over the express but inept 
wording.”); State v. Robinson, 67 Wash. 425, 432−33, 121 P. 848, 851 (1912) (citing Barto v. 
Stewart, 21 Wash. 605, 615−16, 59 P. 480, 482 (1899)) (“When the object and general intent of a 
statute are ascertained, general words may be restrained to it, and those of narrower import may be 
expanded to effectuate that intent.”). 
205. See DeVries v. Dep’t of Ecology, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46, at *8−9 (Sept. 
27, 2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. 
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iii. The Context of the Entire Exemption Statute and the Groundwater 
Code Support a Limited Interpretation of the Stock-Watering 
Exemption 
The context of the entire exemption statute and other statutes within 
the groundwater code indicate that exempt stock-watering withdrawals 
are not unlimited. The overall structure of the exemption statute reveals 
that it is primarily a general rule requiring all prospective water users to 
obtain a permit before withdrawing groundwater.206 The exemption 
provision follows this general rule, and two provisos modify the 
exemption provision.207 The exemption provision begins with the words 
“EXCEPT, HOWEVER . . . .” indicating that it is an exception to the 
preceding rule.208 Accepted principles of statutory interpretation 
mandate that courts narrowly interpret exceptions to general rules.209 
Furthermore, the two modifying provisos that follow the exemption 
provision characterize all of the exempt withdrawals as “small 
withdrawals” that do not exceed 5000 gpd.210 In this way, the structure 
and text of the entire statute support the conclusion that the Legislature 
only intended to exempt small withdrawals from the general permitting 
requirement, and courts must narrowly construe such exemptions to give 
maximum effect to the general permitting rule. An unlimited stock-
watering exemption would be inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent 
that water users must obtain a permit before withdrawing groundwater in 
most circumstances, especially considering the comparatively small 
quantities of water allowed under the other exempt uses and the 
Legislature’s description of the exempt uses as “small withdrawal[s]” 
“not exceeding five thousand gallons a day.”211 
Related statutes within the groundwater code further reinforce the 
interpretation that stock-watering is a limited exemption. To begin with, 
advocates of an unlimited stock-watering exemption argue that an 
                                                     
206. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050; see also supra Part I.B (discussing structure of 
exemption statute). 
207. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. 
208. Id. 
209. See State v. Christensen, 18 Wash. 2d 7, 19, 137 P.2d 512, 518 (1943); Monroe Calculating 
Mach. Co. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 11 Wash. 2d 636, 644, 120 P.2d 466, 470 (1941); see also 
2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:11 (7th ed. 2007) 
(“Where a general provision in a statute has certain limited exceptions, all doubts should be 
resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions.”). 
210. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. 
211. See id. 
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unlimited exemption is not inconsistent with the overall structure of the 
groundwater code because there are other enforcement mechanisms 
within the groundwater code.212 The exemption statute itself provides 
that Ecology may require a person making an exempt withdrawal to 
provide information about the quantity of their withdrawal, and a related 
statute authorizes Ecology to limit groundwater withdrawals to protect 
senior appropriators.213 The Washington State Supreme Court addressed 
this argument in Campbell & Gwinn, however, and the court concluded 
“after-the-fact remedies will not serve legislative purposes as effectively 
as review before [groundwater] appropriation occurs,”214 because 
“damage will already have been done” by the time the enforcement 
mechanisms are invoked.215 
Furthermore, the stated purpose of the groundwater code is 
“regulating and controlling ground waters of the state.”216 The 
groundwater code also mandates that senior surface water rights “shall 
not be affected or impaired by any of the provisions of this 
supplementary chapter,”217 and provides that senior appropriators “shall 
enjoy the right to have any withdrawals by a subsequent appropriator of 
ground water limited to an amount that will maintain and provide a safe 
sustaining yield” of groundwater for prior appropriators.218 The State 
cannot properly regulate and control groundwater and protect senior 
appropriators if unlimited withdrawals of groundwater are made outside 
the regulatory permitting scheme. An exemption allowing unlimited 
groundwater pumping could have a detrimental effect on surface water 
flows that are connected to groundwater sources, and a “devastating 
effect on the ability of the state to protect the senior water right holders 
or to grant future water rights.”219 In DeVries, the PCHB concluded that 
“[a]ll of the objectives of the groundwater code would be undermined if 
                                                     
212. See Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 17−18, 43 P.3d 4, 13 (2002). 
213. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.44.050, 90.44.130. 
214. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 17−18, 43 P.3d at 13. 
215. Id. 
216.  WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.020. 
217.  Id. § 90.44.030. 
218.  Id. § 90.44.130. 
219. DeVries v. Dep’t of Ecology, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46, at *17 (Sept. 27, 
2001); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.030; Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 122 Wash. 2d 219, 
227 n.1, 858 P.2d 232, 236 n.1 (1993) (“[WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.030] merely emphasizes the 
potential connections between groundwater and surface water, and makes evident the Legislature’s 
intent that groundwater rights be considered a part of the overall water appropriation scheme, 
subject to the paramount rule of ‘first in time, first in right.’”). 
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the stockwatering exemption is for an unlimited quantity.”220 As these 
statutes demonstrate, an unlimited exemption is inconsistent with the 
groundwater code’s overall purpose, which is to protect senior 
appropriators and regulate withdrawals to maintain a safe and sustaining 
yield of groundwater. 
iv. The Proper Limitation for the Stock-Watering Exemption is 5000 
Gallons Per Day Based on the Context of the Entire Exemption 
Statute 
As discussed above, the text and context of the statute indicate that 
the Legislature intended to create a limited stock-watering exemption. 
The appropriate scope of that limit is 5000 gpd based on the context of 
the entire exemption statute. Two of the other exempt uses are limited to 
5000 gpd,221 indicating that the Legislature believed this was an 
appropriate limitation for exempt withdrawals. Furthermore, the first 
proviso describes the scope of all of the exemptions as “small 
withdrawal[s]” and the second proviso describes the exemptions as 
withdrawals that do not exceed 5000 gpd.222 When read together, these 
two provisos indicate that the Legislature intended all exempt 
withdrawals to be small withdrawals that do not exceed 5000 gpd. 
The second proviso states that a party withdrawing groundwater “not 
exceeding five thousand gallons per day” may obtain a permit for their 
exempt withdrawal in the same manner as a party “withdraw[ing] in 
excess of five thousand gallons a day” under the general permitting 
provisions.223 It could be argued that the second proviso only applies to 
the exemptions that specify a 5000 gpd limitation, rather than describing 
all exempt withdrawals as limited to that amount. However, a permit 
provides protection for senior appropriators because it documents the 
date the water user acquired the water right and establishes the right as 
senior to all later appropriations. Presumably the Legislature would not 
allow some exempt users to obtain permits, while denying others the 
privilege simply because they are using their groundwater withdrawals 
for a different purpose. There is no logical reason for the Legislature to 
only allow domestic and industrial withdrawals (exemptions that specify 
a 5000 gpd limitation) to obtain the protections offered by a permit, but 
                                                     
220.  DeVries, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46, at *18. 
221. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
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not stock-watering and irrigation withdrawals.224 Furthermore, this 
interpretation ignores the first proviso, which describes all of the 
withdrawals as “small,” indicating that they are not unlimited.225 
In short, a plain meaning analysis of the stock-watering exemption 
supports interpreting the exemption as limited, rather than unlimited, 
based on the context of the statute and related statutory provisions. The 
proper scope of the limitation is 5000 gpd, based on the context of the 
modifying provisos and other exemption provisions within the statute. 
B. Historical Circumstances Support Limiting the Stock-Watering 
Exemption to 5000 Gallons Per Day 
The historical circumstances surrounding the groundwater code’s 
enactment also support limiting the stock-watering exemption to 5000 
gpd. Even though the exemption is limited to 5000 gpd according to the 
plain meaning of the statute, considering historical circumstances is still 
appropriate in this case. While historical context may not be used to 
contradict the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute, the Washington 
State Supreme Court has used historical context to confirm and support 
the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute.226 Pre-enactment historical 
circumstances show that stock-watering was minimal and did not exceed 
1500 gpd when the statute was enacted in 1945.227 Post-enactment 
developments show that in 1946 the statute was interpreted as limiting 
all exempt withdrawals to 5000 gpd, and in 1947 the Legislature 
implicitly endorsed this interpretation when it amended the statute.228 
The correct interpretation of the stock-watering exemption requires an 
answer to the same fundamental question addressed in Campbell & 
Gwinn: Did the Legislature even contemplate the possibility that future 
groundwater users would be entitled to exempt withdrawals that exceed 
5000 gpd for stock-watering?229 Because little legislative history for the 
groundwater code exists,230 historical circumstances immediately 
                                                     
224. See id. 
225. See id. 
226. See Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash. 2d 674, 687, 80 P.3d 598, 604 (2003). 
227. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 54; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s report). 
228. See WDCD, supra note 20, at 46; 1947 Wash. Sess. Laws 655 (codified as amended at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006)). 
229. See Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 16−17, 43 P.3d 4, 13 (2002). 
230. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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surrounding the enactment of the groundwater code provide especially 
valuable insights into the Legislature’s intent.  
Pre-enactment historical circumstances reveal that the groundwater 
exemption was almost certainly enacted to support the development of 
small family farms that were not expected to require more than 1500 
gpd. When the Legislature enacted the exemption in 1945, the state and 
federal government were in the process of developing the Columbia 
Basin region into family farms.231 A report from the Bureau of 
Reclamation issued in the same year that the statute was enacted advised 
that the average fully developed farm would require less than 1500 
gallons of water per day.232 The Legislature likely relied on this report 
when enacting the exemption statute for several reasons. First, the report 
indicated that securing a domestic supply of water at minimum cost was 
necessary for successful settlement.233 The Legislature accomplished this 
goal by providing an exemption to the general permitting regulations.234 
Second, the report suggested groundwater was the most promising 
source for rural development,235 and the Legislature created an 
exemption within the groundwater code, but not the surface water 
code.236 Third, the necessary categories of water discussed in the 
report237—irrigation of lawns and small gardens, domestic uses, water 
for livestock—parallel the categories that the Legislature exempted in 
the groundwater code.238 
Post-enactment historical circumstances further support the 
conclusion that the Legislature intended stock-watering to be limited to 
5000 gpd. In 1946, one year after the groundwater code was enacted, the 
Department of Conservation interpreted the statute as allowing 
withdrawals “for any purpose where the quantity is less than 5,000 
gallons per day,”239 and in the agency’s opinion, that “[f]ive thousand 
                                                     
231. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at III; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLUMBIA 
BASIN PROJECT (SECOND DRAFT) (1998), 
http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/projects/washington/columbiabasin/history.html. See also supra Part 
II.A (discussing the Columbia Basin Project). 
232. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 54; see also supra Part II.A (discussing the 
Bureau of Reclamation’s report). 
233. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 53−54. 
234. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 (2006). 
235. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 55. 
236. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44 (groundwater code) with § 90.03 (surface water code). 
237. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 54. 
238. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050. 
239. WDCD, supra note 20, at 46.  
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gallons per day will supply ample water for household use for a family, 
their garden and lawn irrigation, and stock water.”240 In 1947, one year 
after this interpretation was published in a report to the Legislature, the 
Legislature added the second proviso describing all exempt uses as “not 
exceeding five thousand (5,000) gallons a day.”241 The Legislature was 
presumably aware of the Department of Conservation’s interpretation 
when it amended the exemption statute,242 so the Legislature implicitly 
affirmed the interpretation that the statute limits all exempt uses to 5000 
gpd when it added the second proviso describing the exemptions as “not 
exceeding five thousand gallons a day.”243 
Furthermore, there is no indication that the enacting Legislature ever 
contemplated the possibility of the industrialization of the livestock 
industry. The Legislature may have anticipated that technology would 
eventually allow water use to exceed the Bureau of Reclamation’s 1500 
gpd estimation,244 but there is no evidence that the Legislature 
contemplated the possibility of future commercial livestock operations 
supporting thousands of cows and requiring as much as 100,000 gallons 
of water per day.245 Census statistics reveal that in the 1940s the average 
Washington farm was much smaller than today,246 and contemporary 
reports predicted livestock water requirements would be minimal for 
fully developed farms.247 The Bureau of Reclamation’s “vision of a rural 
West built on small farms” was in the process of being realized through 
the Columbia Basin Project,248 and the decline of the family farm and 
rise of industrialized, concentrated livestock farms did not begin 
occurring until several decades after the statute’s enactment.249 The 
                                                     
240. WDCD, supra note 20, at 46.  
241. See 1947 Wash. Sess. Laws 655 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 
(2006)). 
242. The Department of Conservation’s interpretation was written in its annual report to the 
Legislature. See WDCD, supra note 20. 
243. See 1947 Wash. Sess. Laws 655 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.050 
(2006)). 
244. FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 54. 
245. See, e.g., DeVries v. Dep’t of Ecology, PCHB 01-073, 2001 WA ENV LEXIS 46, at *8−9 
(Sept. 27, 2001) (dairy farm was withdrawing between 39,000 to 56,000 gpd, with the potential to 
eventually withdraw about 110,000 gpd). 
246. Compare 1940 CENSUS supra note 96, at 536−37 (average farm size 100 acres or less) with 
2002 CENSUS, supra note 98, at 48 (average farm size 430 acres). 
247. See FARM IMPROVEMENT, supra note 67, at 54. 
248. See Pisani, supra note 70, at 391. 
249. See Geisler & Lyson, supra note 85, at 1−2; GOLLEHON ET AL., supra note 93, at 11; see 
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groundwater code was enacted to protect Washington’s groundwater 
resources from the “destructive competition” and the “uncontrolled 
withdrawal of [ground]water” that had already caused damage to 
existing water rights and investments in the state, indicating that the 
Legislature’s purpose in enacting the groundwater code was to prevent, 
not facilitate, unlimited withdrawals of groundwater.250 If the 
Legislature could have envisioned the possibility of concentrated 
livestock operations, it almost certainly would have specifically limited 
the stock-watering exemption.  
Pre-enactment historical circumstances demonstrate that the 1945 
Legislature most likely considered stock-watering to be naturally limited 
to small withdrawals, making an express limitation within the statute 
unnecessary. Post-enactment circumstances indicate that the Legislature 
agreed with the Department of Conservation’s interpretation limiting all 
exempt withdrawals to 5000 gpd. There is no evidence suggesting the 
Legislature recognized or considered the possibility of the 
industrialization of the livestock industry that subsequently increased the 
amount of stock-water a single farm is capable of utilizing. These 
historical circumstances support the conclusion that the Legislature 
intended to limit all exempt uses, including stock-watering, to 5000 gpd. 
C. The Public Policy Underlying the Groundwater Code Supports 
Limiting the Stock-Watering Exemption to 5000 Gallons Per Day 
Finally, contemporary groundwater management issues and the 
underlying policy of the groundwater code support a narrow 
interpretation of the stock-watering exemption. Although Washington 
courts have stated that it is the Legislature’s duty to amend statutes that 
changing societal conditions have rendered obsolete,251 they have also 
said that where two reasonable interpretations of a statute exist, the 
interpretation that better advances the overall legislative purpose and 
underlying public policy should be adopted.252 In this case, no 
                                                     
also supra Part II.B (discussing industrialization of livestock industry). 
250. See WDCD, supra note 20, at 44; supra Part I.A. 
251. Kim v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 115 Wash. App. 157, 163, 61 P.3d 1211, 1214 
(2003). 
252. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Dep’t of Ecology, 86 Wash. 2d 310, 321, 545 P.2d 5, 12 (1976); see 
also Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Marr, 54 Wash. App. 589, 593, 774 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1989) (citing 
Safeco Ins. Cos. v. Meyering, 102 Wash. 2d 385, 392, 687 P.2d 195, 200 (1984)) (stating “the 
paramount concern . . . is to ensure that the statute is interpreted consistently with the underlying 
policy of the statute”). 
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amendment is required because the text of the statute, related statutes, 
and historical context all indicate that the stock-watering exemption was 
intended to be limited when it was enacted.253 
Between the limited and unlimited interpretation, the limited 
interpretation better advances the groundwater code’s underlying policy 
of “regulating and controlling ground waters of the state”254 and 
maintaining a “safe sustaining yield” of groundwater.255 Increasing 
population pressures, declining groundwater levels, and Ecology’s 
severe backlog of permits and lack of adequate funding are currently 
impeding sustainable management of Washington’s groundwater 
resources.256 Declining groundwater levels are especially significant in 
the dry eastern region of the state, which also contains most of state’s 
livestock industry.257 An unlimited stock-watering exemption could have 
a direct impact on the communities in eastern Washington that depend 
on groundwater. In an era of declining groundwater resources, the 
groundwater code’s purpose of protecting senior water rights and 
managing groundwater in a sustainable manner is of primary 
importance. Allowing unlimited exemptions from the groundwater 
code’s regulatory scheme undermines these important policy goals. 
CONCLUSION 
Washington’s stock-watering exemption for groundwater is limited to 
5000 gpd under Washington’s principles of statutory interpretation. 
When interpreting statutes, the court’s primary goal is ascertaining and 
implementing the Legislature’s intent.258 The plain meaning and 
historical context of the exemption statute show that the Legislature 
intended to limit all exempt withdrawals to small withdrawals of 5000 
gpd.259 Contemporary groundwater management issues and the 
                                                     
253. See supra Part V.A & V.B. 
254. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.44.020 (2006). 
255.  Id. § 90.44.130; see also supra Part I.A & Part I.B (discussing purposes of the surface and 
groundwater codes). 
256. See ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 10, at 75, 78−79, 83, and accompanying text; Bruhl & 
Ralston, supra note 12, at 13, and accompanying text; Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 
Wash. 2d 1, 18, 43 P.3d 4, 14 (2002) (discussing Ecology’s permit backlog and lack of funding). 
257. See Skoldrud et al., supra note 13, and accompanying text. 
258. See Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 9−10, 43 P.3d at 9 (citing State v. J.M., 144 Wash. 
2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720, 724 (2001)); see also supra Part IV.A (discussing the importance of 
legislative intent in statutory interpretation). 
259. See supra Part V.A & V.B. 
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groundwater code’s underlying policy goal of managing Washington’s 
groundwater resources in a sustainable manner reinforce this 
interpretation.260 While this Comment is limited to a discussion of the 
proper interpretation of the current stock-watering exemption, disputes 
over the proper interpretation of the exemption statute will not be truly 
resolved until the discussion is shifted away from what legislators 
intended in 1945 to a discussion of the proper role for exempt 
withdrawals today.261 After years of encouraging both agricultural and 
urban growth, Washington must realize that water is a limited resource 
that cannot sustain all uses over time.262 Revising the groundwater code 
to limit exempt uses and enhance Ecology’s ability to regulate the state’s 
water resources will be necessary to support future urban and 




                                                     
260. See supra Part V.C. 
261. See Clarke, supra note 15, at 3. 
262. See ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 10, at 75, 84−85.  
263. See ASHLEY & SMITH, supra note 10, at 75, 84−85. The Washington State Supreme Court 
acknowledged, “It is no secret that water availability is a crucial issue in this state, and will become 
even more so as time passes.” Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash. 2d at 18 n.9, 43 P.3d at 13 n.9. The 
court went on to say, “The problems faced by developers and others seeking to appropriate water 
could be ameliorated to a degree if the Legislature would provide adequate funding for studies, 
resources, and personnel necessary to carry out the water resource laws and regulations.” Id. at 18, 
43 P.3d at 13. 
